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JETSE SPREY

Cleveland State University

Explanatory Practice in Falnily Studies

This article makes a case for a more flexible and
realistic explanatory practice in the family field.
It discusses current descriptive, conceptual, and
theoretical approaches. Furthermore, attention is
paid to the phenomenon of explanation itself, to
its predictive power and to the logical context of
its questions and answers. In addition to the use
of selected sources from the realm offamily stud
ies, the presentation adopts ideas from the do
mains of the philosophy of science, mathematics,
aiul related social sciences.

Now faith is the substance of things hoped for,
the evidence of things not seen.
Hebrews 11:1
The question "What is an explanation?" ~rarely is
asked by family scholars. J;>~spit~,this,their coJ
lective explanatory endeavor! ~lfemsneither hap
hazard nor purely idiosyncra9cr;E~plru.ning som~
thing, on the whole, tends to be ~ ~een as' different
from trying to understand it,th~ latter offering a
"deeper" but also a less rigorqus:t}1Ile <;If knowing.
Our explanatory practice ref1e~t~ a pecking order
in which theorizing outranks conceptual analysis
and "mere" description. Usually, the last two ap
proaches are not seen to be explanatory at all.

Department of Sociology, Cleveland State University, Cleve
land, OH 44115. Correspondence address: 2211 Westminster
Road, Cleveland Heights, OH 44118.

Key Words: conceptualization, description, explanation,
methodology, prediction. theory.

A ~ few quotes from recent work by established
family scholars may serve to illustrate the forego
ing. First, two statements lifted from a chapter ti
tled "Family Power" by Szinovacz (1987): "It is
only when we attempt to explain or predict power
that a dynamic conceptualization and careful in.;
vestigation of 'powering' become necessary" (p.
656) and "For a descriptive analysis of power, a
static model of control may suffice, but an expla
nation of power relations must reflect the com
plexity and dynamics of ongoing 'powering' pro
cesses" (p. 659). Explanation, in these statements,
entails both prediction and dynamic conceptual
ization, in contrast to a static descriptive analysis.
A second example, from an essay on the histo
ry of theorizing in the family field, is equally
telling: "Theory is explanation; it answers the
questions how, why, under what conditions. It is
not description, myth or legend, or ideology"
(Adams & Steinmetz, 1993, p. 75). Here, eJl:plain
ing appears as an integral aspect of theorizing and
is linked to specific modes of questioning.
Contrary to the above views, I see explaining
as a sense-making activity that, depending on its
specific context, can be descriptive, conc~ptual, or
theoretical. In other words, "what an explanation
is,or can be or ought to be, depends ;n any given
case upon its context and upon the character of the
inquiry in which it occurs" (Gallie, 1968, p. 20).
My stance essentially reflects an image of
marriage and family process as one of collective
survival and potential prospering, under complex
and basically uncertain conditions. Explanations
of marriage and family living-and of the institu
tional arrangements that fashion reproduction and
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being a daughter is something relative: Every
the care of offspring in our society-thus must be
woman is a daughter, and every daughter is a
sought at the crossroads of several scholarly
woman, yet ~ing a daughter is not the same as
fields. This has led to a discipline marked by a
being a woman.) Since an explanation is an an
heterogeneity of focus, differing and, at times,
swer, it is evaluated vis-a-vis a question, which
conflicting interests, and a discourse character
is a request for information. But exactly what is
ized by dissensus as well as consensus (Sprey,
requested ... differs from context to context. (p.
1990). This, in tum, suggests an explanatory en
156)
terprise that allows for the management-not nec
essarily the resolution-of the intellectual and , In other words, our explanations to chil~n differ
ideological disputes that are likely to continue as': . from those to adults, those to the ignorant differ
from those to the experts, and those to strangers
an integral aspect of family studies.
differ from those to friends.
This essay is about explaining as a process and
Of course, the "ignorant" and children are un
as the outcomes of that process. It is not meant to
likely consumers of the explanatory contributions
be a purely theoretical effort, nor does it aim to
of family scholars, whose audience consists of
present specific recipes for the explanation of
their professional colleagues, clinicians, informed
phenomena and events. I intend to make a case
policy
makers, and a relatively select segment of
rather-than to prove one. In line with this, myar
those who exist in marriages and families. One
gument is fashioned by "following the common
must ask, therefore, how separate is this audience
scientific practice of the ,persuasive use of cita
from
the one studied by scholars, guided by clini
tions" (Kellert, 1993, p. xii). After a brief treat
cians,
and manipulated by policy makers? In this
ment· of explanation per se--especially the logic
essay the line between. what family scholars do
of its questioning and its predictive power-de
and what their "sllbjects" do is a dotted one. In
scription, conceptualization, and theorizing are
fact,
a good number of the quotations offered in
dealt with in tum as explanatory strategies in the
this article echo the explanatory practices of those
family field.
who live the realities of our subject matter's
world. It is here, I believe, that a reflection on the
ON EXPLANATION
s~te of explanatory practice in the family field
differs fundamentally from that in either physics
An explanation is a statement designed to make
or
biology.
sense of something that, so far, remains poorly
What further complicates attempts to under
understood ~d inadequately accounted for. It is
stand
the nature of explaining in all scholarly dis
the answer to a question and, in that capacity,
ciplines is the fact that explanations serve not
must accomplish two things. First, the curiosity of
merely as answers but a:lso as assertions. They
those asking the question should be satisfied. Sec
present claims one wants to have accepted as
ondly, especially in scholarly domains of inquiry,
valid, relevant, and of importance to the state of
the explanation 'should provide credible and rele
knowledge in and, perhaps, beyond one's field.
vant information..
One desires more than just to satisfy one's own
Pragmatically speaking, one could argue that
curiosity, and this requires a set ofshared conven
an explanation has served its purpose 'when the
tions, an established "methodology," and a cul
curiosity of its questioners is satisfied. Decades
ture in which such standards are recognized and
ago the physicist P. W. Bridgman (1928) wrote
sanctioned.
that "examination will show that the essence of an
explanation consists in reducing a situation to ele
The Status Quo
ments with which we are so familiar that we ac
cept them as a matter of course, so that our cu
Earlier cited perceptions of explanation in our
riosity rests" (p. 37). Some contemporary scholars
field illustrate, perhaps unwittingly, that a con
reject this view as too simplistic (cf. Salmon,
ventional frame of reference may lose its hold un
1984), and their point is well taken. Bridgman's
evenly, more thoroughly at one point than anoth
comment, however, touches on an intrinsic aspect
er. As a discipline, our own past seems firmly
of all explaining, namely its relativity. In his im
rooted in the seminal contributions of Hempel
portant book The Scientific Image, the philoso
and Oppenheim (1988), to whom explaining
pher Van Fraassen (1980) put it this way:
meant the sUbsumption of what must be account
Being an explanation is essentially relative, for
ed for, the explanandum, under a set of laws or a
an explanation is an answer. (In just that sense,
theory. For Hempel and Oppenheim, the univer
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sality o.f such laws was seen to. be "indispensable"
(p. 23). They wrote that theories, as explanato.ry
systems,
have the functiQn Qf establishing syste~tic CQn
nectiQns amQng the data Qf Qur experience, so. as
to. make possible the derivation Qf SQme QfthQse
data from Qthers. AccQrding as, at the time Qf the
derivation, the derived data are, or are nQt yet,
knQwn to. have Qccurred, the derivatiQn is re
ferred to. as explanatiQn Qr predictiQn. (Hempel
. & Oppenheim, 1988, p. 32)

Explanatio.n, then, appears to. be the ultimate aim
o.f theo.rizing and an integral 'Part o.f its process. In
such a scheme of things predictio.n and explana
tio.n represent two. sides o.f o.ne co.in. The fo.rmer
tells the future, the latter aCCo.unts fo.r the present
and the past. In this "mechanistic" Newto.nian
framewo.rk, time serves as the fo.urth dimensio.n
o.f space and, as such, strengthens allusio.ns to.
causality. It no. lo.nger flies like an arro.w and its
irreversibility is go.ne, a point to be taken up again
later in this essay.
From its inceptio.n Carl Hempel's "no.mo.lo.gi
cal" model has been challenged and amended by
philo.so.phers (Salmo.n, 1984; Van Fraassen,
1980).. So.cial scientists, especially cultural an
thro.polo.gists, ihcreasingly emphasize "ideo.graph
ic" o.r case o.riented explanatio.ns (cf. Geertz,
1983; Ro.saldo., 1993) as a suitable, mo.re realistic
alternative. Yet, so.me o.fthe no.mo.lo.gical model's
basic tenets co.ntinue to.teverberate in the family
do.main, even amo.ng tho.se who. aremo.ving to.
ward a "Po.stpositivist" appro.ach (Tho.mas &
Wilco.x, 1987). Furthermo.re, the family field it
self has changed o.ver the past decades, intellectu
ally and ideo.lo.gically (Sprey, 1988). It may be
time, therefo.re, to. co.nfront the tensio.ns that re
main :within the confines o.f the field's explanato.
ry practice.
'
My rejectio.n o.f an exclusive linkage between
explanatio.n and theorizing will surface repeatedly
througho.ut the fo.llo.wing discussio.ns. I do. indeed
reco.gnize theo.ry as the prime explanato.ry vehicle
in family studies, but I do. no.t see it necessarily as
its mo.st valuable and/o.r desirable co.ntributio.n to.
practitio.ners o.r to. tho.se who. struggle to. survive
in current marriages and families. Others also.
have made this point, and Scanzoni and Marsiglio
(1993) seemed to. extend it to. allscho.larly ex
planato.ry effo.rts when they ·o.bserved that ~'al
tho.ugh mo.st o.f to.day's researchers are ho.peful
that their wo.rk will have so.me practical benefit, it
is o.ften unclear whether they are asking the kind
o.f research questio.ns that will help supply the
mo.st practical answers" (p. 107).
j

The French so.cio.lo.gist Pierre Bo.urdieu (1977)
co.ntended that peo.ple who. live in marriages and
families functio.n first and fo.remo.st as strategists
rather than as ho.mespun theo.reticians. To. survive
and prosper, they rely o.n time-tested pragmatic
so.lutio.ns rather than theo.ries. In a similar' vein a
co.ntempo.rary ethno.grapher wrote:
In everyday life the wise guide themselves as
Qften by waiting to. see hQW events unfold as by
plans and predictions. When in dQubt, people
find Qut about their worlds by living with ambi
guity, uncertainty, Qr simple lack Qf knQwledge
until the day, if and when it arrives, that their
life experiences clarify matters .... We Qften
improvise, learn by dQing, and make things up
as we go. alQng. (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 92)

This is no.t to. suggest that scho.larly explana
tio.ns and practice are inco.mpatible-far from it.
It is a reminder, ho.wever, that, ultimately, all o.ur
explanatio.ns are abo.ut practice. It seems illusio.n
ary, therefo.re, to. co.nsider o.ne's explanato.ry prac
tice-theo.retical o.r o.therwise-as to.tally separate
fro.m the explanato.ry practice o.f those o.ne stud
ies. What matters, then, is no.t the do.tted line be
tween the practice o.f tho.se who. ask the questio.ns
and that o.f tho.se to. be surveyed, but rather the
scho.lar's preconceptio.ns about any fo.rm o.f co.n
tempo.rary human existence .. In his remarkable
bo.o.k, Postmodern Ethics, Zygmunt Bauman
(1993) labeled postmodernity as "mo.dernity with
o.ut illusio.ns" and suggested that such illusio.ns
"bo.il do.wn to. the belief that the 'messiness' o.f
the human world is but a tempo.rary and re
pairable state, so.o.ner o.r later to. be replaced by
the o.rderly and systematic rule o.f reaso.n" (p. 32).
Po.stmo.dernity includes an awareness that "the
'messiness' will stay whatever we do. o.r kno.w,
that the little o.rders and 'systems' we carve o.ut in
the wo.rld are brittle, until further no.tice,and as
arbitrary and in the end co.ntingent as their alter
natives" (p. 34). One do.es no.lhave to. share Bau
man:$ image o.f co.ntempo.rary so.cial reality to.
reco.gnize that it expo.ses as an illusio.n the co.n
ventio.nal dicho.to.my between the scho.larly o.b
server and his o.r her human subjects.

On Prediction
Predictio.n rarely occurs fo.r its o.wn sake but,usu
ally happens fo.r a variety o.f reaso.ns.Many re
flect underlying assumptio.ns. This is well illus
trated in the fo.llo.wing co.mment by the edito.r o.f a
multidisciplinary bo.o.k, Predicting the Future: .
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A notion as fundamental as prediction does not
exist in a vacuum. It is attached to a variety of
other concepts which are linked in a ,systematic
way and constitute part of the very fabric of
thought of the society in question. What we mean
by prediction is grounded therefore in a set of
cultural assumptions about the relationship of the
present to the past as well as to the future,about
what we take to be knowledge about the world
and how we arrive at it. (Howe, 1993, p. 4)
The conventional linkage between the worth of an
explanatory statement and its predictive power,
for ex.ample, reflects cultural assumptions as
much as it does rational thought. In our culture,
knowledge implies power (cf. Elias, 1984; Fou
cault, 1980) so that prediction allows for control
of the present and the foreseeable future.
Howe's statement also takes us back to the role
of time in our explanatory efforts. As a fourth di
mension of Newtonian space, the dynamics of
time can and traditionally have been dealt with in
tlie framework of four-dimensional geometry.
may be useful in some physical sCiences but
far less so in the biological and the social sciences.
In the words of a prominent mathematician:
Today. general relativity is the direct heir of
Newtonian cosmology. The geometrical proper
ties of Einstein's four-dimensional space-time
translate into laws of motion.... From Newton
to Einstein the mathematics has beCome infinite
ly more complicated. 'Butthe outlook is the
same: Time is absorbed into space; the laws of
motion become 'problems in geometry. Theuni
verse is closed upon itself, regulated by strict de
terminism. (Ekeland, 1990, p. 109)

This

Ekeland observed that recent work in advanced
mathematics shows time to be both unpredictable
and "innovative" and, as a concept, far closer to
the real world than it had appeared to be in New
ton's or Einstein's scheme of things:
A simpie mathematicalmodel,the baker's trans
, formation, has helped us understand how this
notion of time can arise in a purely deterininistic
world.... In this kind of situation the challenge
,to scientists is very much like that of giving an
accurate picture of a stream, with its ever-chang
ing flow, its currents and eddies. (Ekeland, 1990,
p.110)
In that sense, predicting means singling out con
figurations of events that mayor are likely to hap
pen in the future. Time, thought of in this way,
enters' into the "stream" and becomes part of its
flow rather than remaining ofilya dimension of its
external environment. It becomes "a successIon
of fleeting states, largely independent of each

other. The traces of the past disappear very quick
ly, and each instant of time brings something
new" (Ekeland, 1990, p. 111).
What, if anything. does the above have to do
with the ways in which family scholars ex.plain
phenomena and events? Perhaps a great deal, de
pending on the degree to which one is willing to
challenge the premises that underpin one's ap
proach. The reliance on longitudinal research. for
example. rests on the premise'that the flow of
time is continuous and that the past does not dis
appear but is causally linked to the present and
the future. The theoretical PQssibility that, over
time, systems may lose their "memory" or be
come effectively separated from it, rarely seems
to occur to family scholars. Cross-national com
parative research often ,rests on the premise that
an hour'sor a day's time is the same all over the
world. However. the idea that "fleeting states" of
time could be independent of one another poses a
major challenge to that assumption.
The fact that 10 years in our past equals 10
years in the future is mathematically correct, but
in terms of real time perhaps somewhat mislead
ing. The idea that an 80-year-old person is twice
as old as a 40-year-old also ~eems somewhat un
realistic. Would the average 80-year-old really
see himself or herself as halfway to 160? By the
same token, reaching middle age may mean to
some the end, to others a new beginning. Does all
this mean, then, that predictability-as a stan
dard-should be eliminated in the evaluation of
explanatory worth? Not necessarily. After all, not
much of it exists in family studies to begin with. I
see predictability asa desirable. risky, and thus
limited potential, one that to :be worthwhile re
quires, among other things, a good deal of atten
tion to the context of what is to be foretold and an
awareness of what can and cannot be known
under any given set of circumstances.
It seems to me that family scholars could ben
efit from modeling their predictive strategies after
those of a field like meteorology, This would
mean a focus on the "stream" rather than on just
the things that float along in it It would locate re
lational or process-oriented concepts, such' as
"asymmetry" and "turbulence," centrally in one's
conceptual scheme. In that manner, it might be
easier to grasp the systemic nature of phenomena
like violence-prone bonds. fragile networks, or il
legitimacy-prone families. On this level of analy
sis it is not possible to identify which marriages
will dissolve or become violent, but this is some
thing many researchers do not wish to predict in
the first place.
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The above ideas are far from new. Henri
Poincare (195211908), the intellectual ancestor of
the mathematics of nonlinear systems or chaos
theory, wrote in 1908:
Why is it that showers and even storms seem to
come by chance, so that many people think it
quite natural to pray for rain or fine weather? ...
We see that great disturbances are generally pro
duced in regions where the atmosphere is in un
stable equilibrium. The meteorologists see very
well that the equilibrium is unstable, that a cy
clone will be formed somewhere, but exactly
where they are not in a position to say: a tenth of
a degree more or less at any given point, and the
cyclone will burst here and not there.... If they
had been aware of this tenth of a degree, they
could have known it beforehand, but the obser
vations were neither sufficiently comprehensive
nor sufficiently precise, and that is the reason
why it all seems due to the intervention of
chance. (pp. 68-69)

Despite the impressive work of a growing number
of contemporary family scholars, especially on
the macro-level of analysis, the dynamics of mari
tal and family processes continue to dude all but
explanations of a statistical and, therefore, corre
lational nature. In such explanatioris, informative
as they may be, "chance" continues to playa sig
nificant and, perhaps, undeserved part.
Questions and Answers

In a previous section Adams and Steinmetz
(1993) were cited as defining anexplanationas

providing answers to the questi9*:"liow,~' "why/'
and "under what conditions.!' iTaking my cue
from erotetic logic (Bromberget, 'll992), I suggest,
however, that all English-langtiagd questions ini
tiated with "What," "how," "When," "where~"
"which," and "who"differ fundamentally from
sentences beginning with "why;" The ones in the
first set reflect, each in its own:way, different
premises underlying the exact 9at1JIe of their an
swers than is ,the case for "whr" questions. The
latter, in contrast to all others, requires "because"
answers. "What is this?" thus differs fundamen
tally from "Why is this the case?"
In this essay, interrogative !sentences begin
ning with "what" or "how" ar~' labeled as either
descriptive or conceptual; "under what condi
tions" simply represents another way of asking
"how." "Why" questions are seen as theoretical.
All categories of questions are potentially ex
planatory, but a caveat is in order. In everyday
discourse many' answers are not expected to ex
~ .

II

1'1

'

plain anything at all. A request for the correct
time does not demand any explanation. The dis
'tinction made here is an analytical one and is de
signed to clearly separate different lines of ques
tioning.
Erotetic logic deals with the relationships be
tween questions and answers. Much of its content
appears'too technical to be of direct use to stu
dents of the family. Heuristically, however, its
premises and some of its observations should be
of interest to anyone involved in the appraisal of
our current explanatory practice.
Let me touch briefly on some pertinent ideas.
First, as expressed by Bromberger(l992):
Every question stands in three different relations
to specifiable propositions. Some propositions
give rise to it; some propositions are presupposed
by it; some propositions are direct answers to it.
For instance, "The Empire State Building is
heavy" gives rise to "How heavy ... ?" ''There is
a King of France" is presupposed by "What is the
age of the present King of France?" and "The
present King ... weighs 500 pounds" is a direct
answer to "What is the weight of the present
King of France?" (p. 120)

'A proposition gives rise to a question if it impos
es the condition that a correct answer to it does
exist; it is a presupposition for a question if its
falsehood means that the question has no correct
, answer. Ask a foolish question and you get a fool
ish answer (Belknap & Steel, 1976).
The notion of a direct answer is a central tenet
in erotetic logic. As a response it may be either

true or'ialse"but it must "completely, but just
cornpl~t~IY"ipnswer the question (Belknap &
Steyl" 1',9;76, p~ 3). And, finaliy,as Belknap and
: I' ' , '
"~I
Steel (1996) ekplained:

, hb ~b~rii~k of a question addres!Sed~ a q~ery

syste.ri isn(jt 'to be. identified with bow the' sys
tem prPc~ss~s the query ... but iather1jt is to be
iclenclfied':with a range of answetrthat'the ques
don ~1'Illit~; That is, for a query system and a
tiser to! agte~ 6n the meaning of ~. question is for
there to b6 an 'agreement as to what counts as an
answer to the question, regardless of how, or if,
any answer is produced. (p. 2)

If I ask, "Which ,hat did you wear last night, the

blue one or the red one?", I presume that my re
spondent did wear a hat and that it was either red
or blue. The statement "not the red one" may be
true but does not answer my question. Other
nonanswerS are: "I did not wear a hat," "not the
blue one," or "I wore a baseball cap:' If the pre
conditions for a question
not properly met in

are
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the format of its statement, it becomes spurious
because it allows for irrelevant responses.
The presuppositions that underpin "what" and
"how" questions differ from those of "why" ques
tions because their descriptive attributes are fi
nite. A "what" question is "canceled when one of
its direct answers is confirmed. It is tentatively
canceled when one of its direct answers is shown
to be probable or warranted" (Bromberger, 1992,
p. 121). The same holds for "how" questions.
"Why" questions call for answers that, in turn,
may allow for additional questioning. Their "be
cause" responses invoke the presence of forces
such as fate, empirical causality, or the ,power of
the supernatural. A question like "What happened
hereT can be answered descriptively and conclu
sively, but "Why did this happen?" allows, in
principle. for a seemingly endless chain of further
questions.
With this in mind, it is instructive to consider
the current state of questioning in family studies.
How, for example, does one rate questions that
are raised simply because, so far, no one has
asked them? What about the questioning that
guides so-called exploratory research? Does it
produce "exploratory" answers? And how do we
evaluate the questioning that underpins our ever
growing data banks? Is it important because of
the descriptive quality of its responses? Or is
there more to it?
DESCRIPTION

In family studies, as in all the human sciences, the
term description stands for the generation of spe
cific inventories. When one describes, one aims
to compile reliable empirical accounts or, as
Webster's dictionary has it, "lifelike images" of
specific things or events. The usefulness of such
stock taking lies in its presumed degree of preci
sion and reliability. It generally is assumed that
sound descriptive information may serve as a first
step toward further conceptual and/or theoretical
reasoning. However, these data alone are not con
sidered explanatory.

Focused Description
The foregoing may hold for ordinary instrumental
stock taking, but it paints an inadequate picture pf
,the role of description in family studies, There,
descriptive work tends to be focused and de
signed to answer specific "what" or: ''how'' ques
tions. The latter are guided by preconceptions
about what is to be described.

The sense making of any specific descriptive
piece of work depends on its focus. For example,
how well does it allow ''noise'' to be separated
from relevant information? How far do its data
reach into the future? To give a mundane exam
ple, a telephone directory provides reliable infor
mation and a degree of predictive power but does
not offer valid grounds for conceptual, let alone
theoretical, reasoning.
Reliable, descriptive data tend to be seen as
objective and, as such, true representations of re
ality. This is an illusion because objective mea
sures are not intrinsic to the real world. The
human-made criteria designed to evaluate desig
nated facts remain in essence arbitrary. To clarify
this basic point, assume that we have access to
three clearly recognizable images of a given per
son, namely a photograph, a painted portrait, and
a penciled caricature. It makes no sense, then, to
ask which one of these best represents the real
person. Instead, we choose the one that serves our
interest and matches our preconception of what
the individual in question "really" is like. As an
attribute of description, objectivity at best is a
working hypothesis-at worst, a potentially mis
leading misconception.
Because focused description answers "what"
or "how" questions, its explanatory worth de
pends as much on the quality of its questioning as
on the ways in which the responses are obtained.
A foolish question begets a foolish answer, re
gardless of whether it is asked during an in-depth
interview or as part of a mailed questionnaire.
This may be overlooked when issues of logic are
ignored during disputes about the pros and cons
of different data-gathering strategies. Consider,
for example, the following quote from an other
wise excellent treatise ,on the art of mterviewing:
Even though fixed-question-open-response inter
viewing may at first appear to be a systematic
approach to qualitative interviewing, it is not. It
is a different approach entirely. While studies
using this approach may avoid some of the vul
nerabilities of qualitative interviewing studies,
they also lack their strengths. (Weiss, 1994,
p.14)

The voice of logic, seems muted throughout this
statement. One might ask, for example, what ex
actly is the strength of "qualitative interviewing"?
Is its power superior ip the discovery of the truth?
If so, which one? The pho!ograph? The painted
portrait?Or perhaps the caricature? I assume that
scholars who opt for the use of interviews know
what they are looking for. But I wonder if they re
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alize that even the most carefully framed "what"
or "how" questions are unlikely to produce valid
"because" answers.
To place the above issue in a broader perspec
tive, let me return to mathematics-the most ''un
real" of all sciences. In a discussion of Henri
Poincare's contributions to that field one reads:
As a general rule, Poincare, who is without peer
where computing is concerned, pushes his calcu
lations as far as they will go. When the limit is
reached, he first surveys the road he has covered
thus far, and then he tries to peer ahead into the
mist. ... At this frontier of knowledge, one must
change instruments. For quantitative methods,
accurate but limited in scope, we must substitute
qualitative methods, which have greater range
but less precision. Poincare was the undisputed
master of qualitative methods, which he intro
duced under the name of analysis situs-nowa
days topology. (Ekeland, 1990, p. 35)

Poincare was one of the first scholars to stress the
limitations of Newton's mecanique celeste and to
challenge its deterministic underpinnings, thus
opening the door to the study of nonlinear sys
tems or so-called chaos theory.
The choice between a quantitative and a quali
tative approach thus involves more than a consid
eration of the merits of different strategies of data
gathering and analysis. Nor can it be equated with
a choice between postpositivist and hermeneutic
approaches. Rather, it represents .a choice be
tween two methodologies in the broadest sense of
that term. One of these is, by design, quite accu
rate but limited in the scope of its "why" ques
tioning. The other aims for greater depth but al
lows for less precision.
At this stage in the discussion, however, it be
comes necessary to consider the potential move
of focused description toward the level of theoret
ical explanation. When this happens, "what"
questions make room for "how" questions. In and
of themselves, the latter are descriptive, explain
ing how something works but not telling us why
such is the case. "How" questioning, however,
may foreshadow theoretical reasoning and, in that
.capacity, link focused-often conceptualized
descriptive work to theoretical questioning.
Not surprisingly, the boundaries between de
scriptive and other explanatory pathways remain
disputed. In ethnography, a discipline overlapping
family studies, theoretical thinking is discussed as
a possible legitimate aspect of field research. For
example, Marcus and Fisher (1986) wrote the fol
lowing:

Within anthropology, ethnographic fieldwork
and writing have become the most lively current
arenas of theoretical discussion and innovation.
Ethnography's concern is with description, and
present efforts to make ethnographic writing
more sensitive to its broader political, historical,
and philosophical implications place anthropolo
gy at the vortex of the debate about the problem
of representing society in contemporary dis
courses. (p. vii)

Others, however, !ie.e competent descriptive work,
because of its line of questioning, as essentially
atheoretical (Atkinson, 1990; Hammersley,
1992). I share that view but, as stated earlier, at
the same time consider theorizing as only one
quite special approach among the spectrum of ex
planatory strategies.
At the present time, much published research
in family studies appears basically descriptive: Its
questioning is not designed to reach beyond the
"what" or "how ... ·Such work increasingly utilizes
large data sets and sophisticated statistical proce
dures. Its products seem analogous to maps in
that they chart. unexplored territories and/or up
date existing inventories. They help identify
available routes, but do not tell us where to go.
Reliable, up-to-date "maps" of the distribution
and course of processes such as marital dissolu
tion, domestic violence, dual career marriages,
and mate selection are crucial in ongoing attempts
to diagnose the state of and the changes in the re
alities of contemporary marriage and family liv
ing: Given the insights and skills of the scholars
involved, they also provide the foundation for
deeper questioning.
CONCEPTUALIZATION

A concept isa definition with a purpose. It usual
ly is created to serve with others of its kind as
part of a ·coherent analytic vocabulary, one that
will allow for explanatory thinking. Such concep
tual frameworks can be seen as "ways of organiz
ing experience; they are systems of categories
that give form to the data of sensation; they are
points of view from which individuals, cultures,
or periods survey the passing scene" (Davidson,
1984, p. 183). Apart from providing a necessary
condition for theoretical reasoning, such schemes
organize our knowledge and may make a kind of
. sense that reaches deeper and beyond the sense
making offered by descriptive maps; In that role,
concepts guide but also set a limit to one's poten
tial to observe. One may think about strain, for
example, as either mental or physical. This does
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not mean that the two are similar but, rather, that
both can be understood as variations on a com
mon theme. John Gottman's (1994) "cascade"
model of the divorce process also offers a good il
lustration. It is a concept born as a metaphor and
then recruited to describe the. course of a marriage
on its way to dissolution.
The foregoing illustrates the explanatory
power of conceptual reasoning. Concepts by
themselves are not theories, and their explanatory
potential differs from that of theories. By the
same token, concepts may well become an inte
gral part of theorizing because they provide the
vocabulary by means of which "why" questions
are formulated.
As a process, conceptualization may evolve
from description, but a focused descriptive study
also may have been conceptually infonned from
its outset. In other words, reasoning descriptively
and conceptually seems likely to follow a path of
reciprocity rather than one of strict linearity. It is
quite possible, though, to halt an explanatory
march at the conceptual stage. The mere placing
of seemingly isolated events in a broader context
may be sufficient to meet the needs of given prac
titioners or of family members trying to make
sense of their joint lives. On the frontiers of mari
tal and familial existence, such direct answers
maybe enough to help manage problems or solve
contingencies. So why go on asking?
Eventually, however, isolated concepts, illu
minating as they may be, are likely to be linked to
others in more or less coherent analytic vocabu
laries. The concept of minority, for example,
tends to be linked with that of power, ethnicity
calls forth culture, and so forth. In the history of
family studies, Hill-and Hansen (1960) were the
first to recognize the value of such conceptual
frameworks. Their stated aim was not theoretical
per se but, rather, to take a "step that raises the in
ventory beyond simple accumulation toward real
significance" (p. 299). That, I suggest, is what
conceptualization is all about.
THEORETICAL ExPLANATION

In contrast to the preceding two approaches, theo
ries are expected to answer ''why'' questions, but
many myths and legends also answer these. ques
tions. Unique standards have been formulated
over the years to distinguish theoretical accounts
from folklore, legends, and explanations anchored
in the supernatural. These criteria, however, re
main arbitrary and open to revision. What theory,

myth, and the supernatural do share is their ulti
mate dependence. on faith, on "the evidence of
things not seen" (Hebrews 11: 1).
Much published work in our field qualifies as
theoretical only in a broad sense of the word.
After reviewing the 19 theory-focused contribu
tions to the Sourcebook of Family Theories and
Methods (Boss, Doherty, LaRossa, Schumm, &
Steinmetz, 1993), I noted that "a telling reminder
of the state of our theoretical enterprise is that
theorizing, conceptualization, and even descrip
tion continue ... to mean different things todif
ferent scholars in our field" (Sprey, Atkinson, &
Fine, 1993, p. 512). Even theory-oriented papers
do not always invoke underlying theoretical as
sumptions. Their arguments often follow what
one prominent scientist (Hoyle, 1994, p. 106)
called a "look-see" method. To find out if mili
tary combat experience affects the marital careers
of veterans, for example, the obvious strategy is
to gain access to or create a suitable data set and
then find out what the facts are (Gimbel & Booth,
1994). This approach also allows one to investi
gate how marital quality, divorce, and remarriage
affect the exchange of help between parents and
offspring (Amato, Rezac & Booth, 1995), to see
how the rising proportion of unmarried adults im
pacts on the balance of parent-child exchanges
(White & Peterson, 1995), and so forth.
Such explanatory strategies do not necessarily
exclude the use of theory. In fact, one may find
certain theoretical considerations cited as the ratio
nale for testable hypotheses or for models to be fit
ted to the real world. In carrying out the research,
some of these theoretical concerns are accepted
and others rejected. Those that are rejected do not
always feature in the conClusions of such inductive
research. They may be discarded and achieve the
status of wrong guesses. This is not surprising be
cause answers to ''what'' and "how" questions are
not directly suited to explain why specific working
hypotheses tum out to be incorrect.
So one might ask, when can explanatory state
ments be seen as theoretical? In the context of
this essay I would suggest that asking one or
more valid "why" questions would be sufficient.
But, given the state of knowledge in our field,
would it also be necessary? To this question I
have no ready response. My inclination is to an
swer that it depends on the degree to which the
"hows" in the explanation not merely allow but
actually inspire subsequent "why" questioning.
Two brief references to recently published, high
quality research may serve to Clarify this admit
tedly disputable point of view.
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In a thorough study of urban-rural differences
between patterns of aid giving, Amato (1993)
borrowed from social disorganization theory,
overload theory, and subculture theory in order to
lay the foundations for his questioning. Each of
these "mini-theories," however, provided only a
limited conceptual vocabulary, so that all three re
mained precariously integrated into the logical
structure of the study's analysis. The formal ties
among the three also were left relatively unex
plored. In his final summation, the author report
ed, among other results, that urbanites are some
what more likely to exchange help with friends
than people Who live in rural settings and suggest
ed that such "associations appear to exist because
the settings have different demographic mixes
and because urbanites move more often and live
farther from relatives" (p. 261). This sounds rea
sonable, but seems not directly relevant to any
one of the earlier cited theories. The conclusions,
then, derive their explanatory worth from their
contribution to our empirical knowledge about
how friendship ties appear to operate under pres
ent-day urban and rural conditions.
A second example, taken from a good study of
the linkages between women's occupational and
caregiving roles (Moen, Robison, & Fields,
1994), also provides insight into the dynamics of
explanation. The authors of this study wanted to
discover if "prolonged caregiving spells preclude
women's on-going involvement in a paid job in
the same way that caring for preschoolers has"
and if "adult caregiving demands hinder women's
entry or re-entry into the labor force" (p. SI76).
They discovered, among other things, that "more
recent cohorts of American women are more like
ly than those born earlier in the century to take on
the caregiving role, despite their increased in
volvement in the paid labor force and the societal
revolution in gender expectations" (p. SI84).
This finding caused the authors to wonder why
caregiving for ailing relatives is still considered to
be the province of women (p. SI67). Because
their study design was informed by a major con
ceptual frame of reference-that of the life
course-such a move toward "why" questioning
seems warranted. To respond to this question,
however, will require a theoretical perspective in
which the dynamics of sociocultural change are
of central concern. This means, for instance, ask
ing why sociocultural change, such as that in the
prescription of gender roles, may appear inconsis
tent and even haphazard.

This, in tum, implies a challenge to some or
all of the givens that still underpin much theoreti
cal thinking in our field. To illustrate this point,
consider a comment by an established ethnogra
pher (Rosaldo, 1993). It addresses a similar issue:
In my view, this gap separating description and

conclusion derives from an unresolved tension
about whether to describe cultures as loosely
tied bundles of informal practices, or as well
formed systems regulated by control mecha
nisms, or as the interplay of both. (p. 94)
To move from how to why in order to make theo
retical sense of seemingly "unruly" findings in
volves more than a choice between conceptual
schemes or even mini-theories. It means coming
to grips with the preconceptions that underlie and
fashion the ways in which we begin to imagine
what it is we wish to explain.
The following two brief quotations from re
cently published work in the natural sciences
should make this clear:
The evolution of a chaotic system is sensitive to
the precise specification of the initial state; this
means that irrespective of how complex our
models become, or how accurate our weather
data are, the laws of science impose a limit be
yond which prediction of the weather is impossi
ble. (Palmer, 1992, p. 71)
Biological systems, from communities and pop
ulations to physiological processes, are governed
by nonlinear mechanisms. This means that we
must expect to see chaos as often as we see cy
cles or steadiness.. ".. We would all be better off

if more people realized that simple nonlinear
systems do not necessarily possess simple dy
namical properties. (May, 1992, p. 95)
If we conceive of marital and family processes as
essentially "nonlinear," we must accept that under
certain conditions their cultural interiors indeed
may best bethought of as "loosely tied bundles of
informal practices" (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 94). Judith
Stacey's (1990) book Brave New Families, for
example, seems to bear this out. And so does
Oscar Lewis' (1966) seminal, much older, study
of Puerto Rican families in the "culture of pover
ty." In the lives of such families, conflict and
peace, order and disorder, coexist. The families'
niere continuation-sometimes misinterpreted as
stability-resembles currents in a river that, de
spite repeated episodes of flooding and extreme
turbulence, still manages to find its way.
Returning for a moment to Moen et aI.' s study
"(1994), there is no theoretical rationale to assume
that the continuing changes in and between gen
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der roles will follow a linear path. Changes reflect
a process of "orderly chaos," that is, one quite
sensitive to initial states, not necessarily continu
ous, and thus basically unpredictable.
On the institutional level, a view of process as
chaotic may, among other things, help us to see
changes in divorce, marriage, and illegitimacy
rates as indications of sociocultural "turbulence"
and, therefore, as ultimately system maintaining
instead of destructive. Changes in these rates may
signal a societal process in which institutionalized
forms of human sociability compete for a chance
to evolve, dominate, or simply survive. Andrew
Cherlin's (1992) careful study of the past and cur
rent course of marriage, divorce, and remarriage
may help illustrate this.
, In his chapter on explanations, Cherlin noted
that no one foresaw the postwar baby boom, and
that, of the explanations of the ups and downs in
postwar divorce rates, "most can be classified as
either 'period' or 'cohort' ones" (p. 31). This may
be of interest to demographers but to me it indi
cates that such accounts, on the whole, amount to
little more than well-reasoned post facto interpre
tations. Cherlin himself improved on such efforts
by framing the course of the postwar decades as
"one long-term historical process" and "two spe
cific historical events" (p. 62). He then explained
the former as one in which "society-wide changes
in women's worklives and reproductive lives
have promoted the acceleration of .the long-term
rise in divorce and the long-term fall in fertility
that has characterized the United States since the
mid-nineteenth century" (p. 63). The Great De
pression and World War II are singled out as the
events that interfered with the normal course of
long-term historical development. Cherlin's ex
planation is not theoretical in a neo-positivist
sense which, in my view, does not make it less
explanatory or "sense making." It does not tell us
much about the future course of events. There is
no reason to assume, for example,that the next
"great depression" will affect the institutions of
marriage and family in ways that resemble what
happened in the past. One of the main theoretical
contributions of family demography seems to be
that its findings effectively undermine our faith in
the presence of linear causality throughout the
course of any long-range sociocultural process.

IN CONCLUSION
In his autobiography, the astronomer and Nobel
Prize recipient Fred Hoyle (1994) remarked that

an idea "leads nowhere unless it can be followed
up either by an experiment or by a precise calcu
lation" (p. 230). In principle, I agree with him. In
our field, we 'do have ideas but very few mathe
matical trajectories and, except on the micro
level, no real experimentation to speak of. So
where does this leave our explanatory practice?
Where it always has been, in our own hands.
With this in mind I offer some final comments
and close my case.
A crucial problem of explanatory practice in a
realm as diverse as ours is for it to achieve both
credibility and relevance. To address this, i will
again refer to Van Fraassen's book (1980). In a
chapter on the pragmatics of explanation, he
wrote:
If you ask a scientist to explain something to
you, the information he gives you is not different
in kind , . , from the information he gives you
when you ask for a description, . " , To call an
explanation scientific is to say nothing about its
form or the, sort of information adduced, but,
only that the explanation draws on science to get
this information (at least to some extent). (pp.
155-156)

This comment illuminates several issues that were
raised throughout this essay.
First, a focused description can be offered as
an intentional explanation and, in a proper con
text, accepted as such. The same is true for con
ceptual accounts. Because of its unique level of
questioning, a theoretical explanation can be ei
ther "quantitative" or "qualitative," depending on
what the questioner has in mind. As long as the
appropriate "why" questions are raised, the selec
tion of a fitting research design'remains primarily
a technical problem.
This means that on the theoretical level; far
reaching choices must be made. Such decisions
are not merely rational but also reflect practical
and normative issues. As the well-known anthro
pologist, Clifford Geertz (1983), put it:
The strict separation of theory and data . , . the
effort to create a formal vocabulary of analysis
purged of all subjective reference, the "ideal lan
guage" idea; and the claim to moral neutrality .•.
none of these can prosper when explanation
comes to, be regarded as a matter of connecting
action to its sense rather than behavior to its de
terminant. The refiguration of social theory rep
resents . . . the sea change in our notion not so
much of what knowledge is but of what we want
to know. (1983, p. 34)
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The quest for theoretical refiguration implicit in
the above is shared by a growing set of scholars
in family studies (Gubrium & Holstein, 1993;
Thomas & Wilcox, 1987). My view on the use
fulness of explanatory vocabularies differs from
that of Geertz but I do agree that explaining in our
field also seems overly concerned with "what
knowledge is" at the expense of "what we want to
know." Most relevant, however, is the interdepen
dence of these two standards. After all, what we
want to know depends on how we decide what
knowledge really is. But that decision, in tum, is
likely to be influenced by what we, collectively
and/or as individuals, consider worth knowing.
Let me pursue this important point by means of a
final example.
Darwinian evolutionary theory rests on the
idea that evolutionary change is blind and an out
come of a continuing interplay between the forces
of chance and necessity. The theory lacks the pre
dictive power coveted by positivist scholars, but
its explanations manage to place a range of seem
ingly unconnected facts into understandable con
figurations. It represents a qualitative or singulari
ty-focused type of explanation, an approach that,
parenthetically, is far from exclusively Darwini
an. Poincare's earlier cited analysis situs also is
qualitative. In contrast, Newto~'s equations show
both the power and the limitations of determinis
tic quantitative explanation. They explain the mo
tion of the planets, the cycle of the tides, and the
ways in which things fall. They are not of much
help, however, in attempts to understand why

gravity works the way it does, or with the expla
nation of climate and the weather.
How, then, will family scholars choose to
imagine the realities of marriage and family liv
ing? Will they imagine them as analogous to the
trajectories of the stars or the everlasting pound
to the' weather or the flow of a
ing of the tides?
river on the way to its ultimate destination? These
basic choices cannot be judged as true or false but
rather as useful or useless. The relevance of the
choice to those who decide is contextual and, as
such, reflects the aspirations, knowledge, and his
tory of those who raise the questions. For some of
us the choice will be part of a search for God's
truth, for others knowledge as a step towards lib
eration, and, perhaps for a few, the outcome of an
insatiable curiosity. To label any of such prefer
ences as either wrong or correct would be, espe
cially in a discipline like ours, unrealistic and
counter-productive.

Or

NOTE
This article is a thoroughly revised and expanded ver
sion of a paper presented at tl)e Theory and Methodolo
gy Workshop of the annual meeting of the National
Council on Family Relations in Minneapolis, Minneso
ta, November 1994.
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